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Abstract
We analyze the relationship between housing and the business cycle in a set of
51 U.S. cities. Most surprisingly, we ￿nd that declines in house prices are often not
followed by declines in employment. We also ￿nd that national permits are a better
leading indicator for a city￿ s employment than a city￿ s own permits. [JEL: C32, E32,
R11]
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In a recent paper, Leamer (2007) argues that real estate markets are grossly understudied
by macroeconomists interested in understanding business cycles. He asserts several stylized
facts about the behavior of the national housing market over the business cycle including:
1) residential investment leads the business cycle and a fall in residential investment is a
reliable harbinger of a recession, and 2) volumes, rather than house prices, are what matter
for business cycles.
This paper furthers our understanding of the relationship between housing and the busi-
ness cycle by exploiting the cross-sectional variation in both business cycles and housing
markets across Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Because housing is fundamentally a
non-tradable good, the housing market is a city-level phenomenon; in the short to medium
run, consumers may ￿nd it di¢ cult to substitute between housing across cities. Glaeser and
Gyourko (2007), for example, document that time dummies explain only about a quarter of
the variation in city-level house price changes, suggesting that most of the variation in house
prices comes from city-speci￿c factors. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) similarly ￿nd that state
and regional factors, rather than national factors, drive the majority of the movement in
house prices.
In addition, a growing literature has documented substantial heterogeneity in both the
timing and magnitude of business cycles at di⁄erent levels of disaggregation. For example,
Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) use state-level data to analyze what determines growth rates
during recession and expansion phases; Owyang, Piger, Wall, and Wheeler (2008) apply a
similar framework to U.S. cities. These studies ￿nd that the timing (and, potentially, the
number) of recessionary experiences vary across regions.1
MSA-level variation enables us to identify empirical regularities in the relationship be-
1Carlino and DeFina (1998) and Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) show that the e⁄ects of monetary policy
di⁄er substantially across regions. The majority of this literature attributes these di⁄erences to industry
composition and the makeup of the regional banking sector. See also Carlino and Sill (2001) and Crone
(2005). Housing, which may be thought of as a key component in the propagation of monetary policy, has
been largely neglected due to the highly aggregated (i.e., states or larger) geographic unit of analysis.
1tween housing and the business cycle more robustly than with national data alone. While
large real declines in house prices at the national level have been rare during the post-war
period, several cities in our sample experienced large and sustained declines in house prices
over the last 25 years. Understanding how house prices a⁄ect employment in these cities
may help us to understand whether the national recession that began in December 2007 was
due to factors that simultaneously lowered house prices and employment or whether declines
in house prices themselves played a key role in driving economic activity.
We ￿rst seek to determine if the stylized facts Leamer identi￿es at the national level
are also true for our sample of MSAs. Because residential investment is not available at
the MSA level, we proxy for residential investment using permit data. We ask whether
housing variables are robust leading indicators of employment after we control for national-
level factors. Smets (2007) points out that the appearance of residential investment as a
leading indicator may be due to cycles in interest rates. Since housing is known to be
sensitive to changes in interest rates (e.g., Hamilton, 2008), interest rate shocks may drive
both residential investment and employment.
We also assess the relationship between housing prices and employment over the business
cycle. Earlier work has not reached a consensus on the relationship between the business
cycle and house prices: Iacoviello (2005) ￿nds that a decline in aggregate housing prices leads
to a decline in gross domestic product (GDP). Davis and Heathcote (2005) ￿nd that the
contemporaneous correlation between national-level HP-￿ltered house prices and output is
65 percent over the 1971-2001 period. In contrast, Kan, Kwong, and Leung (2004) examine
annual city-level data and ￿nd that the contemporaneous correlation between house prices
and output growth is less than 15 percent.
Consistent with Leamer￿ s ￿ndings, we ￿nd that house prices are poor leading indicators,
but that increases in a city￿ s permits do not always raise employment in that city. Instead,
national permits are a more consistent leading indicator for employment at the city level. At
the national level, we ￿nd that permit shocks raise employment after we control for ￿nancial
2factors and oil prices. We also explore the possibility that the housing market in￿ uences
employment over the business cycle in a nonlinear fashion. In particular, we use a Markov-
switching model with time-varying transition probabilities (TVTPs) to ascertain whether
housing variables are signi￿cant in in￿ uencing the probabilities that cities move between
expansion and recession regimes. The ￿ndings from our Markov-switching model do not
support the notion that housing variables in￿ uence the probability of being in a recession.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our data and
documents the correlations between housing indicators and employment at the national and
MSA level. Section 3 presents the results from the VAR used to identify whether, and
which, housing variables are good leading indicators for MSA-level employment. Section
4 provides a preliminary comparison of local business cycles and the MSA-level housing
variables. Section 5 presents the results of our TVTP Markov-switching model formalizing
the notion that housing drives cyclical ￿ uctuations. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Preliminary Look at Local Housing Cycles
2.1 Data
Our goal is to examine the relationship between housing and economic activity for a cross-
section of cities. Unfortunately, residential investment ￿a key housing variable ￿is unavail-
able at the MSA level. We can, however, proxy for residential investment using permits,
either in units or values. There is a substantial amount of high-frequency variation in our
permit series, with all series exhibiting strong low-frequency variation. This requires us
to somehow ￿lter the data before establishing anything about the relationships among the
series. We isolate the business cycle relationships by ￿ltering the data in the frequency
domain with the optimal band-pass ￿lter suggested by Corbae, Ouliaris, and Phillips (2002)
and Corbae and Ouliaris (2006).2
2This approach has the advantage of not forcing us to take a stand on the relationship between the
variables at low frequencies. The ￿lter extracts the component of each series associated with cycles of
6 to 32 quarters. We also looked at linearly detrending the series; the results suggested an even weaker
3The U.S. Census Bureau (2009) summarizes the relationship between permits and residen-
tial investment at the aggregate level as follows: ￿Current surveys indicate that construction
is undertaken for all but a very small percentage of housing units authorized by building
permits. A major portion typically get under way during the month of permit issuance and
most of the remainder begin within the three following months.￿ Indeed, the contempora-
neous correlation between band-pass ￿ltered residential investment and band-pass ￿ltered
permit values at the national level is 98 percent.
In addition to seasonally-adjusted permits (both units and values), we use house prices as
a secondary measure of the housing market. Our nominal house price series are the Freddie
Mac Conventional Mortgage House Price Indices (CMHPIs). Real house and permit values
are constructed for the analysis. Our measure of economic activity is MSA-level seasonally-
adjusted non-farm employment.
Data availability dictates our choice of cities (51 in total) and sample period. Table 1 lists
the cities in our sample, the de￿ ator used to convert nominal variables into real variables,
and the sample period for which all MSA-level series are available.3 Although permit data
begin for most cities in our sample in 1982Q1, we chose to use 1983Q1 as the starting point
for our analysis to avoid starting our analysis in the middle of a national recession. We also
include a few cities for which permit data do not become available until 1984Q1. Our data
end in 2008Q4.
Finally, we include several national-level variables that may a⁄ect both housing variables
and employment. To control for the stance of monetary policy, we include the federal funds
rate. We also include national-level core consumer price index (CPI) in￿ ation, the 30-year
conventional mortgage rate, and the spread between 3-month commercial paper and 90-day
Treasury bills as a measure of credit market turmoil.
relationship between housing variables and employment than when we band-pass ￿ltered the series.
3Our sample excludes a few large and economically important cities which lack either permit or employ-
ment data for the full sample: permit data for New York begin in 1988 while employment data for Boston
and Washington, DC, start in 1990.
42.2 Correlations
One of Leamer￿ s ￿ndings is that residential investment ￿though a small component of GDP
￿is a large factor in economic ￿ uctuations around turning points. A similar relationship
appears to exist between our national housing variables and national employment (Figure 1).
The major peaks and troughs in employment correspond fairly closely with NBER recession
dates; exceptions are that the 1991 and 2001 troughs are delayed in the employment data
because of the jobless recoveries. For house prices, the cyclical component is dominated by
the period from 2004-2008. As a result, in computing a simple correlation over the whole
sample period, house prices appear to lead the business cycle. However, as the top panel
of Figure 1 illustrates, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between the two
variables for the initial portion of the sample, even at turning points. As the bottom two
panels show, permits ￿measured in units or values ￿appear to be a more consistent leading
indicator of the national cycle with the highest correlation occurring at a lead of 5 quarters
(Table 2).
Housing￿ s performance as a leading indicator is weaker when examined at the city level,
where the average correlation between MSA house prices and MSA employment is roughly
half that of national house prices and national employment. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate
the cross-sectional diversity in the data by plotting both MSA-level housing series along with
employment for a representative group of cities. Table 2 shows the average correlations be-
tween the housing series and employment at the MSA level. Altogether, house prices are
procyclical in about 80 percent of our MSAs. However, the pattern di⁄ers substantially
across MSAs. In 22 of the 51 MSAs, house prices lead employment, while 9 MSAs actually
lag. Some MSAs (Augusta, Durham, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, and Wichita) even exhibit
counter-cyclical house price behavior. As with the national data, the weak cyclical relation-
ship between house prices and employment appears to be driven by the 2004-2008 period for
many cities. Excluding the 2004-2008 period reduces the number of procyclical cities to 33,
5less than two-thirds.4
Permits, measured both in values and units, exhibit a more consistent pattern, leading
the cycle at the national level and in 80 percent of our MSAs. The timing of the relation-
ship among our MSAs is similar to the timing of the relationship at the national level. The
similarity between the results for units and values suggests that a simple change in the com-
position of housing cannot explain the leading indicator property of residential investment.
Rather, it appears to be the case that the cyclical pattern in housing is driven by changes
along the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin. Finally, the correlation be-
tween lags of MSA permits and MSA employment is higher than that of lags of national
permits and MSA employment.
The heterogeneity in the within-MSA correlations suggests a national series ￿a weighted
average of a distribution of idiosyncratically moving series ￿may be a poor proxy for city-
level e⁄ects. Table 2 veri￿es this notion, summarizing the contemporaneous correlations
between MSA-level employment, house prices, and permits with their national counterparts.
While the average of the correlations of MSA employment with national-level employment
is 69 percent, they range from a low of ￿23 percent (New Orleans) to a high of 95 percent
(Chicago). Not surprisingly, the lowest concordance with national-level employment occurs
in cities heavily involved in energy production ￿e.g., Bakers￿eld (44 percent), Baton Rouge
(44 percent), Oklahoma City (53 percent), and Tulsa (38 percent). With an average correla-
tion of over 60 percent, MSA-level house prices exhibit substantial concordance with national
house prices but, again, the individual MSA-national correlations vary substantially.
Much of the synchronicity between MSA and national house prices is driven by the
2004-2008 period; prior to that period, city-level house prices exhibited substantially less
concordance, with several cities experiencing long declines in real house prices at the same
4The average correlation between U.S. house prices and MSA employment is higher than the average of
those between MSA house prices and MSA employment. We considered whether changes in national house
prices drive MSA employment. We found that national house prices have a countercyclical relationship with
employment in more than a third of our MSAs and conclude that neither national nor MSA house prices are
good leading indicators for MSA employment.
6time. The correlation over the 1983-2003 period is 54 percent while the correlation over the
2004-2008 period is 77 percent. MSA-level permits exhibit similar concordance with their
national counterpart: Over the full sample, the average correlation of city-level permits with
national-level permits is 57 percent when permits are measured in units and 68 percent when
permits are measured in values.
3 Is There a Linear Relationship Between Housing and Employ-
ment?
Correlations for the band-pass-￿ltered data are suggestive of the relationship between em-
ployment and the housing market. Because there may be causal relationships between both
employment and the housing market, we use a VAR to look at the relationship between the
variables, which allows us to identify the e⁄ect of housing market innovations on the business
cycle. Our VAR approach both exploits the cross-sectional variation in the data and allows
us to include national-level variables. We continue to use ideal band-passed data in our
VAR analysis to ensure that we accurately extract the cyclical components of the data. By
controlling for the national-level variables most likely to a⁄ect housing and employment, we
are able to identify the e⁄ect of shocks to our housing variables on employment.
Because we have a limited number of observations (104) with which to estimate the VAR
and many parameters to estimate for a VAR with four lags, we use principal components to
reduce the dimensionality of the national data.5 For each city i, we estimate the model
Xt;i = A0;i +
p X
k=1








5Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) used this data reduction technique to analyze the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks without making restrictive assumptions about which data the Federal Reserve can and cannot
observe. Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009) also used this technique to study the e⁄ect of price stickiness
using industry-level data while controlling for a host of national factors.
7C is lower triangular, ￿ = CC0, Ft1 and Ft2 are two national-level ￿nancial factors, MSAt;i is
a vector of MSA-level variables, and p is set to 4.6 We control for the type of national-level
￿nancial variables that Smets (2007) suspects drive the leading indicator property of housing
at the national level by constructing Ft1 and Ft2 from Natt = [￿t;FFRt;MRt;Spreadt]
0: ￿t
is national-level core CPI in￿ ation, FFRt is the federal funds rate, MRt is the conventional
mortgage rate, and Spreadt is the spread between the 3-month commercial paper rate and
the 3-month T-bill yield.
3.1 Do MSA Housing Variables A⁄ect MSA Employment?
Results from the preceding section suggested a relationship, albeit varying across cities,
between MSA employment and a city￿ s housing market. To assess this relationship formally,
we estimate (1) with
MSAt;i = [PermV alt;i;Empt;i]
0 (2)
to ascertain how much of the strength of the relationship is due to national ￿nancial factors
a⁄ecting permits. Table 3 contains these results.7 We de￿ne a city or the United States as
reacting primarily positively if the cumulative impulse response function after 19 quarters is
positive.
At the national level, employment rises immediately after the positive permit shock, but
experiences a signi￿cant and sustained decline after four years. At the MSA level, however,
including ￿nancial factors changes the predictive power of permits for many cities. Figure
4 depicts the diversity across select cities of the employment response to a permit shock. In
6Because the cities are small relative to the U.S. economy, we assume that the ￿nancial factors do not
respond contemporaneously to MSA-level shocks. On the other hand, MSA-level variables respond to shocks
to the ￿nancial factors. Since our interest is not in identifying shocks to our national-level ￿nancial factors,
the ordering of these factors does not matter.
7We considered a speci￿cation in which we included MSA house prices in the VAR as a control variable;
we ordered house prices ahead of permit values since house prices have been shown to respond slowly to
changes in macroeconomic conditions (see, for example, Mankiw and Weil, 1989; and Poterba, 1991). The
reactions to permit shocks when we included house prices in the VAR were qualitatively similar to that of
our benchmark case; a few impulse responses became insigni￿cant when we included house prices but the
signs and magnitudes of the reactions were usually the same. We also explored using house prices as the
measure of housing activity. We found that employment responded insigni￿cantly to house price shocks
both at the national level and in almost all of our MSAs.
8our eight selected cities, Atlanta, Baltimore, Orlando, and Tampa have similar responses to
a permit shock with the peak response in employment occurring about four quarters after
the shock. Employment in Tulsa also responds signi￿cantly positively although the peak
response occurs ￿ve quarters after the shock. Employment in Chicago and San Francisco,
however, responds negatively to a permit shock. Altogether, employment responds positively
to a permit shock in slightly less than half the MSAs in our sample (25). Similar to the
reaction at the national level, many (17) of these cities subsequently experience a signi￿cant
decline in employment starting several quarters after the shock. In 9 MSAs, employment
falls immediately after a permit shock.8
We view this as weak evidence that permits lead the cycle. The lack of a signi￿cant
response in some MSAs, the level at which we believe we can accurately identify a permit
shock, suggests that part of the pattern Leamer ￿nds at the national level is due to ￿nancial
factors. Since national permits are simply an aggregation of individual cities￿permits,
national permits fall when there is a shock that a⁄ects a number of cities. For the permit
shock to be pervasive (and perhaps simultaneous) enough to yield a response in multiple
cities, the driver may, in fact, be a national ￿perhaps ￿nancial ￿shock. However, at
the MSA level, permits themselves continue to have some explanatory power although the
response is negative in many cases.9
3.2 Do National Housing Variables A⁄ect MSA Employment?
The preceding discussion assumes that local housing conditions a⁄ect the local business cycle.
However, national housing conditions may a⁄ect local economic conditions (perhaps with
8These results are, for the most part, sensitive to the exclusion of the national ￿nancial variables. For a
few cities (Baton Rouge, Lexington, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, San Diego, and Virginia Beach), excluding the
￿nancial variables reverses the sign of the impulse response. For others (Cleveland, Columbus, Greensboro,
and Stockton), it renders the impulse response insigni￿cant.
9Our identi￿cation strategy at the city level assumes that national-level ￿nancial factors cannot simulta-
neously respond to permits or employment. Since this is a much less plausible assumption at the national
level, we also consider an alternative ordering of the VAR in which the ￿nancial factors are ordered after
economic activity indicators to test the robustness of the e⁄ect of permit shocks on employment at the
national level. The results at the national level are very similar to that of our benchmark model.
9varying timings and degrees) even though no national housing market exists. Suppose, for
example, shocks to aggregate wealth through an increase in house prices raised the demand
for autos, thereby a⁄ecting Detroit￿ s local cycle.10 We, therefore, explore the possibility
that it is not a city￿ s own housing market that in￿ uences its business cycle but rather the
general tenor of the U.S. housing market as a whole. We estimate (1) with
MSAt;i = [PermV alt;US;Empt;US;Empt;i]. (3)
Because house prices appear to have very little explanatory power for employment, we ex-
clude them to reduce the dimensionality of the VAR. However, we include national-level
employment as a control to capture other linkages between MSA and national business cycles
not captured by our ￿nancial factors or permits.
Table 4 summarizes our results from estimating (3) and Figure 5 shows the impulse
responses and their associated 80 percent coverage intervals for a representative group of
cities.11 Here, we see much more consistency in the response of employment to a national
permit shock. Indeed, in about 1/4 of the cities, employment does not respond signi￿cantly
positively to an increase in permits at the national level; most of these cities are dependent
on energy production. Bakers￿eld, Tulsa, and Oklahoma City are all oil drilling centers
while Baton Rouge is a major re￿ning center. Pittsburgh is heavily dependent on steel
production, which is a very energy-intensive industry. Although Austin￿ s industry is not
strongly linked to oil itself, its geographic proximity to Oklahoma City, Dallas, and Houston
likely makes it much more dependent on oil than the other cities in our sample.
To understand why these cities do not respond positively to a national-level permit shock,
Figure 6 plots the band-pass ￿ltered real spot price of West Texas Intermediate crude and
U.S. real permit values. The correlation between the two series is ￿48 percent, with the
real price of oil often falling and permits rising simultaneously. Based on this, we test to
10We thank the referees for bringing these external e⁄ects to our attention.
11These results are robust to a reordering of the variables, Xt;i =
[PermV alt;US;Empt;US;Ft;1;Ft;2;Empt;i]:
10see whether the relationship from Table 4 is spurious by reestimating (1) including Oilt,
the band-pass ￿ltered real spot price of West Texas Intermediate.12 While the strength of
the relationship between national permits and MSA employment falls after we control for oil
prices, there remains more consistency in the relationship between national permits and MSA
employment than between MSA permits and MSA employment. Further, the relationship
between national permits and national employment remains robust.13 We conclude that
employment at the MSA level is in￿ uenced, at least in part, by the national housing market.
4 A Preliminary Look at Recessions and Housing
Much research (e.g., Burns and Mitchell, 1946; Hamilton, 1989) suggests that the business
cycle is an inherently nonlinear phenomenon with asymmetric dynamics. As periods of eco-
nomic decline are rapid and sharp, with expansions being slow-paced and steadier, studying
only the linear relationship among variables may fail to capture important business cycle re-
lationships. Suppose we believe that national housing variables drive business cycle turning
points. That is, declines in permits do not proportionally lower employment but instead
raise the probability of a recession. We might, in turn, expect local housing markets to af-
fect the probability that cities experience recessions. Recent studies ￿e.g., Owyang, Piger,
Wall, and Wheeler (2008) ￿have highlighted the heterogeneity in business cycle turning
points across regions. Using a similar framework, we can construct sets of city-level turning
points with which we can compare MSA-level housing variables.14
Suppose employment growth in city i follows the process
￿Empi;t = ￿si;t + "i;t; "i;t ￿ N (0;￿i); (4)
12We exclude national employment in this speci￿cation to ensure that we are not arti￿cially biasing our
results against permits as an explanatory variable. We order oil ￿rst in this speci￿cation as the price of oil
is determined in world markets, making it exogenous.
13For brevity, we do not report these results here. The complete set of results is available upon request.
14Because Hurricane Katrina so heavily dominates the employment dynamics of New Orleans, we drop
New Orleans in our analysis of MSA-level recessions.
11where the average growth rate, ￿si;t, depends on the regime according to
￿si;t = ￿0;i + ￿1;isi;t; (5)
normalized such that ￿1;i < 0. The unobserved regime, si;t 2 f0;1g follows a ￿rst-order
Markov-switching process with transition probabilities:
Pr(si;t = 0jsi;t￿1 = 0)=pit (6)
Pr(si;t = 1jsi;t￿1 = 1)=qit,
where si;t = 0 indicates the city is in expansion and si;t = 1 indicates the city is in recession.
We estimate the model using the Gibbs sampler with standard, fairly di⁄use priors.
Table 5 summarizes the recession dates in each city and displays the vast heterogeneity in
the timing of the turning points across cities.15 While our national turning points are similar
to those de￿ned by the NBER, troughs tend to be dated later with employment. The cities,
on the other hand, experience several recessions that do not correspond with national-level
recessions. In particular, Akron, Ann Arbor, Austin, Baton Rouge, Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Oklahoma City, Salt Lake City, Tulsa, Boulder, and Wichita experience a recession during
the mid-1980s when the nation as a whole was in a prolonged expansion. While the majority
of cities experience recessions around the time of the aggregate, the starting and ending dates
typically di⁄er. A handful of cities (e.g., Austin, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and Boulder) never
experience the national recession of the early 1990s. Several cities (e.g., Bu⁄alo, Cincinnati,
Columbus, Indianapolis, St. Louis, San Diego, and Virginia Beach) do not recover from the
2001 recession. Oklahoma City and Tulsa continued to expand through the last period in
15In Table 5, we identify a recession as any period in which the posterior recession probability exceeds 0:7
and the recession lasts at least three quarters. Varying the cuto⁄ yields similar results as few probabilities
stray from either 0 or 1. An exception is Durham where we do not see evidence of switching in employment
and thus exclude it from our analysis. Because MSA employment is more volatile than national employment,
we omit from Table 5 periods in which si;t = 1 for only one or two quarters. We also count it as a single
recession if a city experiences one quarter of expansion sandwiched between two recessionary periods.
12our sample, 2008Q4.
Figures 7 compares ￿ltered national and MSA permits (in values) and the recession
probabilities for a few representative cities: Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Chicago, Orlando,
Tulsa, San Francisco, and Tampa. Consistent with Leamer￿ s results at the national level, a
fall in MSA permits does tend to precede a local recession, even for the 2001 recession, which
was associated more with the internet bubble than housing. However, the timing of this
relationship is not consistent across cities. The business cycle peak can be simultaneous
with a decline in housing (Austin 2001; Baltimore 1990) or after a long decline (Chicago
2001; Atlanta 1991 and 2001). Even for the same city (say, Orlando), the business cycle
peak can follow the downturn in housing by a few quarters (1990) or a few years (2000).
In most cities, permits usually begin recovering during the recession, often not far from the
start of the recession, which explains the negative correlation between leads of permits and
employment in Table 2. To use Leamer￿ s terminology, the most noticeable false positive and
false negative occur for Tulsa. Tulsa experiences a trough in permits in 1985, but it does
not enter recession until a full year later after permits have been trending upward.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from examining the relationship between national per-
mits and MSA turning points in Figure 7. National permits increase steadily prior to and
during recessions in both Austin and Tulsa during the mid-1980s. Austin does not experi-
ence even a slight increase in its recession probability despite the decline in national permits
in the early 1990s. Similarly, Tulsa remains in robust expansion in 2008Q4 despite the very
sharp decline in national permits that began more than a year earlier. These ￿ndings may
re￿ ect the fact that many energy-producing regions have business cycles which are disjoint
from the national cycle (see Hamilton and Owyang, 2009).
Figure 8 shows similar plots for MSA and national house prices and local recessions. We
see little consistency in the relationship between MSA house prices and recessions. House
prices are close to ￿ at in Orlando and Tampa around both the 1990 and 2001 recessions.
Large declines in house prices in Austin and Tulsa that begin around 1993, declines that
13are much larger than the fall in house prices either city experiences in 2007 or 2008, do not
cause a recession in either city. In fact, both Austin and Tulsa experience peaks in house
prices in the midst of recessions in the mid-1980s and early 2000s. The relationship between
national house prices and MSA recessions is not much stronger, but it is worth noting that
the rise and fall of house prices in the 2004-2008 period heavily dominate the house price
series shown in Figure 8.
5 Does Housing Drive Recessions?
In this section, we formalize the local housing market￿ s in￿ uence on the probability that the
local economy is in a recession phase. By looking at MSA-level data rather than focusing
on national data alone, we have substantially more recessions with various turning points.
To address the issue, we modify the Markov-switching model from the previous section to
include TVTPs along the lines suggested by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973). This relaxes the
assumption that the probabilities governing the transition between expansion and recession
are constant. Instead, we will assume that these transition probabilities are functions of
national- or MSA-level housing variables.
Suppose that a city￿ s employment growth continues to be characterized by (4) and (5);
however, the unobserved regime, si;t = si;t (zi;t) 2 f0;1g, is a homogeneous Markov process
with transition probabilities:
Pr(si;t = 0jsi;t￿1 = 0;zi;t)=pi (zi;t) (7)
Pr(si;t = 1jsi;t￿1 = 1;zi;t)=qi (zi;t),
which are now determined by a vector of variables, zi;t. We allow the lagged six-quarter-
moving-average of our ￿rst ￿nancial factor, house price growth, and permit growth to in￿ u-
ence the transition probabilities. Using the six-quarter-moving-average has the advantage
of both moderating the high-frequency variation in permits and allowing more distant lags
14to a⁄ect the probability of being in a recession in a parsimonious speci￿cation.
The transition probabilities can be de￿ned in terms of a set of latent variables
s
￿
i;t = ￿0;i + ￿z;izi;t + ￿s;isi;t￿1 + ui;t, ui;t ￿ N (0;1); (8)
de￿ned such that







Equation (8) produces the desired interpretation. The transition probability depends jointly
on the past regime and the vector of zi;t. Letting ￿(￿) denote the standard normal proba-
bility density function,











￿￿0i ￿ ￿z;izi;t ￿ ￿s;i
￿
;
such that a negative value for ￿z;i indicates that an increase in zi;t raises the probability of
staying in an expansion and lowers the probability of staying in a recession. The model can
be estimated via a straightforward application of the Gibbs sampler detailed in the appendix
(see also Filardo and Gordon, 1998).
Table 6 shows the 68 percent coverage intervals for each of our candidate leading indicator
variables on the transition probabilities in our TVTP Markov-switching models. The ￿rst
two columns show the signi￿cance of the in￿ uence of the moving average of permit values on
p(zi;t) and q (zi;t) when zi;t = [1;￿PermMAi;t￿1]. The next two columns show the e⁄ect of
lagged house price growth on employment by setting zi;t = [1;￿PriceMAi;t￿1]. The ￿nal
columns show the 68 percent coverage intervals when zi;t = [1;Fin1MAi;t￿1]; where Fin1
is the ￿rst principal component constructed from the ￿nancial variables described in the
previous section. Neither of our housing variables signi￿cantly a⁄ect the regime transition
15probabilities in any of our cities or at the national level. The parameter estimates for the
regime means and the in￿ uence of the current regime on transition probabilities are highly
signi￿cant and have the expected signs, but are not shown in the interest of space. However,
there is no evidence that ￿nancial factors in￿ uence the transition probabilities either.
6 Conclusions
We assessed the robustness of the relationship between housing and employment over the
business cycle in a set of 51 U.S. cities. In most of the cities we considered, we found permits
to be a good leading indicator of employment. Perhaps because of the disparate business
cycle experiences of the cities, however, this relationship failed to hold across the board. We
also ￿nd that national permits are a better leading indicator for MSA employment than a
city￿ s own permits. Housing prices, on the other hand, are not a good leading indicator for
employment at either the national or the MSA level.
These results stand in some contrast to the previous literature linking housing to busi-
ness cycles. At the national level, housing appears to be an important driver of cyclical
￿ uctuations. If this causality truly held, we would expect the link to be preserved at the
MSA level, as housing spillovers into business cycle indicators (e.g., employment) should
remain localized. This may be especially important to verify at the local level in light of
￿ndings by Del Negro and Otrok (2007) and others that housing shocks are primarily local
phenomena. Our results, however, appear at odds with the ￿nding that there exists a direct
channel (whether it be wealth e⁄ects or housing capital e⁄ects) from local housing markets
into local employment.
Our results should not, however, be seen as evidence that there is no relationship between
housing prices and employment over the business cycle. Clearly, theoretical models such
as Davis and Heathcote (2005) illustrate that there is a relationship. However the lack of
consistency in the relationship at the city-level suggests that the relationship may be more
complicated than simple causal stories wherein a rise in house prices raises wealth, leads
16households to consume more, and then leads to an economic expansion. Furthermore, the
extent to which we ￿nd frequency-dependence in the relationships suggests that increases in
house prices may have a di⁄erent impact in the short term than in the long term. Finally,
our results do not address the question of whether or not housing should play a role in
the formulation of monetary policy: We examine only empirical linkages between housing
markets and recessions and leave the question of modeling optimal monetary policy in the
presence of housing for future research.
While housing played a pivotal role in the recession beginning in December 2007, our
￿ndings suggest caution in assuming that future recessions will ￿t the current pattern. The
diversity we ￿nd across cities in the relationship between housing and employment ￿in many
cities, a rise in permits and especially house prices appears to be associated with a subsequent
decline in employment ￿is further evidence that, as Temin (1998) ￿nds, business cycles are
tremendously diverse.
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Technical Appendix
6.1 Estimating the VAR
We estimate the model using the Gibbs sampler, a Bayesian technique in which the full joint
posterior is obtained from iterative draws from each parameter￿ s conditional distribution (see
Gelfand and Smith, 1990; Casella and George, 1992; Carter and Kohn, 1994). We assume
that the set of parameters consisting of the VAR coe¢ cients and the variance-covariance
matrix are characterized by normal-inverse Wishart priors ￿that is,
A;￿ ￿ NW (￿;S;￿;￿);
where f￿;S;￿;￿g are hyperparameters that govern the shape of the prior. We set ￿ = 0N,
S = IN, ￿ = 0, and ￿ = In, where n is the number of variables in the VAR and N is the
total number of VAR coe¢ cients (in this case, N = pn2 + n). Sampling from the posterior
is a straightforward implementation of Chib and Greenberg￿ s (1996) SUR sampler where the
posteriors are formed from 5;000 draws after discarding the ￿rst 5;000 draws.16
6.2 Estimating the TVTP Markov-Switching Model









16For each draw of the model parameters, we can compute the impulse responses to a shock to any system
variable. To determine whether the impulse responses are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, we examine the
10th and 90th percentiles of their posterior distributions.
20A single iteration of the Gibbs sampler begins with a draw from the posterior distribution
of ￿i conditional on values for ￿
(j￿1)
￿￿i . The prior for ￿2

























i;t , and yi;t = ￿Empi;t.








￿￿i . If the prior for ￿i = [￿0;i;￿1;i]
0
is
￿i￿ 1￿1i<0N (^ ￿i;￿iI2);
where 1￿1i<0 is an indicator function that identi￿es si;t = 1 as the recession state, ^ ￿i =



















￿ ￿i; ￿ Ai￿i
￿
;
where ￿ Ai =
￿
￿iI2 + ￿ Y 0
i ￿ Yi
￿￿1
, ￿ ￿i = ￿ Ai
￿
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, ￿ Yi is a T ￿ 2 matrix with row t








recursively from a Bernoulli distribution using
P (si;tj￿ yi) / P (si;tjsi;t￿1;zi;t)P (si;t+1jsi;t;zi;t+1)f (yi;tjsi;t).




; we apply Bayes￿rule to obtain ￿(j), the conditional

















(1 ￿ p(zi;2))￿(j￿1) + q (zi;2)(1 ￿ ￿(j￿1))
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from truncated normal distributions (see Tanner and Wong, 1987; and Albert and Chib,
1993). If s
(j)
i;t = 0, s
￿(j)





where the truncation is at 0 from the right since s
￿(j)
i;t is negative by de￿nition if s
(j)
i;t = 0. If
s
(j)
i;t = 1, s
￿(j)
i;t is drawn from the truncated normal distribution N
￿
￿￿0;i ￿ ￿z;izi;t ￿ ￿s;i;1
￿
;








to generate draws for ￿i. The prior for ￿i is
￿i ￿ N
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The prior over ￿z;i is relatively di⁄use as we have little information regarding the likely scale
of the coe¢ cient; however, the results were qualitatively very similar for substantially more
di⁄use and less di⁄use priors over ￿z;i. It can be shown (see, for example, Filardo and
Gordon, 1998) that the posterior distribution of ￿i has the form
￿i ￿ N
￿￿ ￿i; ￿ A￿;i
￿
;
where ￿ A￿;i = (I3 + W0
iWi)




0, and Wi is a T ￿ 3
matrix with rows [1; zi;t, si;t]. We repeat this process J = 10;000 times for each city and
discard the ￿rst 5;000 draws as burn-in iterations. See Filardo and Gordon (1998) for
additional details on the Gibbs sampling approach to estimating TVTP Markov-switching
models.
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Shaded regions denote NBER Recessions
29Figure 2: Band-Passed Employment (Solid Line) and Band-Passed Real House Prices
(Dashed Line) for Selected Cities
30Figure 3: Band-Passed Employment (Solid Line) and Real Permit Values (Dashed Line) for
Selected Cities
31Figure 4: Impulse Responses of MSA Employment to an MSA Permit Shock, Selected Cities
Dashed lines denote 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution
32Figure 5: Impulse Responses of MSA Employment to U.S. Permit Shock, Selected Cities
Dashed lines denote 10th and 90th percentiles of the posterior distribution
33Figure 6: Bandpassed Real Oil Price vs. Bandpassed Real U.S. Permits
34Recession Dates for Selected Cities and Band-pass Filtered MSA and U.S. Real Permit
Values
Shaded regions indicate that the probability the city is in a recession is greater than 60%. MSA
and U.S. permit values are on di⁄erent scales.
35Recession Dates for Selected Cities and Band-pass Filtered MSA and U.S. Real House
Prices
Shaded regions indicate that the probability the city is in a recession is greater than 60%. MSA
and U.S. real house prices are on di⁄erent scales.
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